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Psychoanalysis and
Hermeneutics
Sergio Benvenuto

It had been some time since Alcibiades realized that Socrates
was following him without saying a word. But one day, before
Alcibiades was going to speak to the Athenians in the agora,
Socrates brought himself to speak to the beautiful man. The spell
of silence broken, Alcibiades asked in his turn: "Why are you following me?" To this Socrates answered in his typical way, that is,
suspended between amorous ingenuity and pedagogical petulance: "Because I love you .... "
In effect, Socrates knew that the young Alcibiades was a very
ambitious man, one with a very high opinion of himself, who
believed he could give good advice to the mighty Athenians. But
Socrates here insinuated that Alcibiades needed him-specifically
his love and his advice-in order to succeed. So Socrates proceeds to pin him down with a dialogue about what Alcibiades
believes he knows, and about what he should know, as we read in
Plato's dialogue Alcibiades I.
Here we see that Socrates is in love with Alcibiades' soul
[Based on a lecture presented to the Ivy House Seminar at 4 November 1987,
organized by the Middlesex Polytechnic (Faculty of Social Science -Psychoanalytic Study Group), London.]
DIFFERENT/A

5 (Spring 1991)

DIFFERENT/A

80

(rather than his body) as he tries to show him that he does not
know that he does not know, even though he thinks he is the
wisest man among all the Athenians.
"You think you know
what is right for the Athenians, instead you do not know what
is essential, that is, yourself."
In order to exercise one of those activities which Freud
called "impossible," that is, to govern (the others are to educate and to psychoanalyze),1 we need the help of the lover
Socrates, insofar as he invites us to a necessary regression
toward self-knowledge . This regression seems to be the preliminary work for one's own progression in the world. But the
actualization of this delphic invitation will take place only
2000 years after Socrates, through what Freud will call
Uebertragung,transference, the rather vicious passage through
the love of the other. And let us leave this of the, i genitive
form, with the ambiguity it offers between subjective meaning (the other loves the subject), and objective sense (it is the
subject who loves the other).
To quote a passage from the dialogue in question:
Socrates: (. .. ) If the [delphic] inscription suggested to the
eye: "Look at yourself," in which way, and what could we
think it would be suggesting? Would it be suggesting to look
at something through which the eye would be able to look at
itself?
Alcibiades: Certainly.
Socr.: Okay, let's investigate which object we can look at by
seeing it and ourselves.
Ale.: It is clear . .. mirrors and similar objects.
Socr.: Correct . It is not there, though, also in the eye through
which we can see, something of the same kind? ... Have you
noticed that when you look at somebody in the eyes you can
see your own face in the eye of the person in front of you,
like in a mirror, this we call 'pupil' [kore: literally, in Greek,
girl] because it is almost an image of the person who looks
at it?
Ale.: That is true.
Socr.: If, then, an eye looks at another eye and stares at the
best part of the eye through which he can see, he will see
itself.
Ale.: Of course.
Socr.: If, therefore, an eye wants to see itself, it has to stare at
an eye, and more specifically, at that part of it in which the
visual virtue is to be found; is not this what we call sight?
Ale.: Yes.
Socr.: So now, dear Alcibiades, must not the soul too, if it
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wants to know itself, stare at a soul, and most of all, at that
trait into which the soul's virtue is to be found, that is,
knowledge? ... This part of the soul is similar to the divine,
and, if you stare at it, you learn to know all that is divine, the
intellect (noun) and thought, and in this way you have the
possibility to know yourself in the best way.(Alcibiades I, 133)
Let us translate this dialogue into contemporary
language . Plato was indicating
that self-knowledge,
as a
reflexive return to oneself, is not to be taken as the subject's
knowledge of scientific and objective facts, like, for example, the modern neurophysiologist'
s knowledge of certain
relationships
between human cerebral anatomy, thoughts,
and passions.
Socratic knowledge
seems rather to be a
specular re-cognition,
or ac-knowledge-ment, of oneself. It
is thus not objective knowledge-or
-cognition-but
a sub2
that Socrates recommends,
as does
jective re-cognition
most subsequent
Western philosophical
and religious
thought.

II
Psychoanalysis
can be seen as the last modernist offspring of a maieutics which had its noble Western origins in
Plato. It does not take into account the "scientific calculation [computation]"-according
to Heidegger, and also to
Wittgenstein,
scientific knowledge
is essentially linked to
e.g., as
calculation 3-of the subject-as-object-of-knowledge,
a knowable object, as the "girl" or the "boy" in the pupil.
Rather, psychoanalysis
elicits its reflexive, hermeneutic mirror (its pupil) in the re-cognition of one's own truth through
the dialectic intervention of the analyst.
But this recognition entails an ac-knowledgement
which
is both spring and offspring and the conditio sine qua non of
the maieutic elaboration: transference, and the transferential
relationship.
This acknowledgement
is already evident at
the end of the above dialogue when Alcibiades says:
We are about to exchange our parts, Socrates, I take on yours
and you mine. This is because from now on there will not be
a moment when I am not after you as if you were a child,
and when you have not me around as if I were your tutor.
(Alcibiades I, 135)
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Their parts are inverted in this ac-knowledge-ment
like
a [further] pupil-mirror:
it is not the lover Socrates who
shadows Alcibiades,
like a father who takes care of his
child, but Alcibiades who will take care of Socrates.
In a
peculiar sense, each becomes the pupil of the other in a
dialectic which informs also the psychoanalytic cure.

III
Of course this is also a condensation, and something is
changed in the maieutic undertaking.
Because we don't
believe in what Nietzsche called "the socratic ratio," we don't
believe anymore in an identification of the soul with the intellectual instance of ratio, reason, nor do we believe that to recognize truth means to accede to "the Beautiful and the Good" in
ourselves. In the same way, psychoanalysis modifies (or complicates) the amorous intrigue between Socrates-analyst
and
Alcibiades-analysand in its talk of transference and countertransference.
Let us recall the famous story that has become the myth of
origin of psychoanalysis: how Joseph Breuer (Freud's early friend
and master, co-author of the Studies on Hysteria with him) fled to
Venice with his wife in fear of his hysterical patient Anna O's love
for him. Freud, of course, will not be frightened at this manifestation of the monster of transference, and will come to re-cognize its
truth. As did Socrates, who although well known for loving
beautiful young men, was not afraid to lie chastely the whole
night, under the beautiful naked body, willingly offered to his
master, of Alcibiades. Thus, like Socrates who does not love
Alcibiades' body, but his soul, for the sake of which he makes
himself a pupil (as a girl, kor{) for Alcibiades' soul to recognize
itself, so the analyst is not supposed to go to bed with his or her
patients, nor even wink at his/her patient's wish to do so. The
analyst's desire is supposed to be elsewhere; it consists in offering
himself as a mirror-as a pupil, in the ocular sense-in front of
which the subject can recognize the truth of his own desire. And
this reflexion-in its double meaning of both mirroring and thinking-is the only ac-knowledgement the analyst can expect.
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IV
The linguist D. Tagliavini has shown 4 how, not only in Greek
or in English, but also in languages as distant from each other as
Swahili, Chinese, Lapp, or Samoan, the pupil of the eye is referred
to by a metaphor which designates, depending on the language,
"boy" of "girl." In Spanish we find "nina (del ojo)," in Italian
"pupilla" from the Latin word, in Portuguese "menina (do olho)."
In each case the reason would seem to be the same: the "boy" or
"girl" is in fact the image of the one who is looking, reflected in
the pupil of the other's eye. As it is naturally a small, reduced
image, it will in some way be called "child." Thus it is a sort of
trace in speech of what Lacan called "the mirror stage": the primary mirror of a human being is (in) the eye of the other.
We can thus sketch out the dialectic on subjectivity which
Plato already (in AlcibiadesI, and also in Symposium) tried to make
use of: The subject only (ac)know(ledges) himself through alienation in the other, through imaginatively situating himself in that
particular part of the other's body. The human being sees himself
where the other sees him. What Freud called "narcissism" is a
function already inscribed in the Other, in the Other's gaze:
Narcissism is then love of oneself insofar as one is loved by the
Other, insofar as one is the Other's pupil.
The Psychoanalytical "form of life" (to use Wittgenstein's
expression, Lebensform)is therefore founded on the socratic-platonic idea of a "hermeneutic" practice that is a kind of knowledge
based on anamnesis, on an interpretative recognition or acknowledgement. This acknowledgement consists in making sense of
entanglements between different elements. The neurotic symptom, for example, consists of those knots in which the subject has
lost its sense . The analyst's interpretative knowledge, therefore,
surfaces once it has been able to make one recognize something of
himself (in being able to saperefar riconoscere,as one would say in
Italian, or to savoir faire reconnaitre, as one would say better in
French).
When I state that the analyst hermeneutically acknowledges
by allowing the subject to recognize meaning in his symptoms, I
am using the term acknowledgementwith all its ambiguity. Just as
a father legally recognizes an illegitimate child in a double recognition (on the one hand he admits to a real paternal relationship,
and on the other he symbolically includes him within his name,
his descent), the symbolic inclusion is essentially arbitrary. As
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when, by adopt ing a child, even though you are not his biological
father, you recognize him as your own . The psychoanalytic acknowledgement/re-cognition
moves always between these two
poles of meaning . And like the legal recognition of fatherhood,
analytical work also oscillates between a truth and an inclusion: it
both asserts the truth or unconscious desire, and it works a symbolic inclusion of the subject into its "analytical function" through
the analytical bond.
V

It has been objected that the kind of reconstruction I attempt
here is out-of-date, given Lacan's later thought. According to one
objection, the emergence of the subject S---the barred subject-is
correlative to Lacan's abandoning of the concept of recognition .
Thus according to this later Lacan, desire isn't to be recognized
but interpreted . The earlier notion of the subject as a subject of
recognition attributes an identity to it-yet identity is dropped by
Lacan the moment he shifts the aphanisis (the lack of desire) on to
the subject as subject of the signifying chain S, whereby the subject of the chain will no longer recognize itself (as did the classical
subject of recognition). 5
This objection takes for granted an essential difference
between interpretationand ac-knowledge-ment.However, I am here
attempting to show that "interpretation" is a variant of "recognition." Many in hermeneutic philosophy have focused on this
point. Unfortunately, neither in English nor in Italian do we have
the possibility of choosing between two words as in German,
where interpretationcan be translated either Auslegung or Deutung.
In English there is only "interpretation."
A musician , a singer, a theatre director, interprets too. When
a pianist puts on an "original" and "new" performance from a
piece by Mozart , in what sense can we say that he effects a new
interpretationof that piece? And in what sense is this interpretation different from the type of dream interpretation inaugurated
by Freud? Is it essential for an interpretation to be verbal for it to
be an interpretation?
In the conversations about Freud he had
with Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein interpreted the Freudian Deutung
(interpretation) in a wider sense, similar to that of the musician
who re-interprets a piece of music. 6 In this way a distinction is
made by structuralist and hermeneutic thinkings between "sense"
and "meaning.' 17 Let us consider some examples.
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When we listen to a good interpretation of a piece of music,
we may feel that the interpretation is right because it grasps some
truth of the piece being played. This grasping is something like
recognition, because we are talking about the recognition of a
piece of truth which is hidden in that music. It is as if the performer had come up with an authentic possibility of that piece of
music and it is this possibility that appears to be its truth .8
Psychoanalytic interpretation, however, has this additional particular feature : that which has been recognized, in a dream, for
instance, belongs to the subject itself.
What distinguishes the Freudian interpretation, for example
of dreams, is the fact that when the subject comes to recognize the
articulation of a wish in his/her dreams, this wish is not the wish
of a god, nor that of any other entity-rather, it is something that
belongs to the dreaming subject itself, and this is of the utmost
importance. To interpret is, for Freud, to make the analysis and
recognize the fact that a wish is signified behind a slip of the
tongue or within a dream. But how can we justify the psychoanalytic assumption that this wish is the subject's own desire? Why
can't psychoanalysis do without the category of subject? Certainly, there are various more or less behavioral forms of psychotherapy today which do not need to recur to a subject,
whether called "ego," "Self," or "desire." Some of these forms of
therapy, such as those inspired by Gregory Bateson's thought, or
those inspired by Moreno's thought, work with language. 9 For
example, they might give "paradoxical" prescriptions to their
patients . What differentiates them from psychoanalysis, the
Lacanian school included, is the fact they don't aim for recognition of desire as the subject's own desire. Such forms of psychotherapy don't interpret, recognize, or acknowledge:
they
merely prescribe . They function as messages within a system of
communications rather than interpretations which recognize a
piece of truth .
Undoubtedly Lacan's big contribution to psychoanalysis was
to have overcome a clumsy and naive conception of psychoanalytic interpretation . He taught that one interprets without speaking: the interpretation takes place above all through scansions,
emphases, and interruptions of the session. The Lacanian interpretation, then, coincides with a style. Interpretation is less and
less an explicitly meaningful statement, and more like a musician's interpretation of a piece of music. Unlike Winnicott, who
speaks about a "true self" and a "false self," 10 and unlike Kohut,11
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Lacan doesn't attribute any content to the subject or self. In this
sense it is true that, according to some critics, the barred subject S
is but a moment in the signifying chain and the very sign of a lack
in the Other. But Lacan, to the extent that he is a Freudian, keeps
his practice within the horizon of recognition, and this in opposition to any practice based on objective knowledge of a self as if it
were a describable object.
VI

I would liken Lacan's relation to psychoanalysis to Musil's
novel The Man without Qualities. Is The Man without Qualitiesstill a
novel, or is it already a philosophical essay? Undoubtedly, Musil
pushes the form of the novel to its limits: the classical form of
Balzac and Dickens is dilated and deformed to the point of sliding
into something different than a novel ... into something more like
an existential work of philosophy. And yet, The Man without
Qualities remains a novel, in spite of everything. It would, then,
be as absurd to reproach Musil for having written a novel, once
again, encore,as it would be to reproach him for not having written a work of systematic philosophy!
In much the same way, we can say that Lacan pushed to its
limits the Freudian ethics concerning the recognition of desire as
subjectivity, although he remains a Freudian, namely, a psychoanalyst.
There are some Lacanians, at least in Italy, who go so far as to
say that Lacan is only apparently a Freudian, that he goes beyond
the Socratic-Freudian principle of recognition or acknowledgement of truth as truth about oneself. But I think this is a kind of
wishful thinking: it manifests an impatience about overcoming
psychoanalysis which I can appreciate, but which Lacan certainly
did not have.
The starting point of hermeneutic philosophy was the problem of how to read and understand long-dead authors. This led
to a central and striking problem: How is the dialogue with the
other possible? But this question implies a paradox, a vicious circle, something like Heidegger's "hermeneutic circle." The paradox is that the other with whom we try to converse is defined by
the fact that he is out of the conversation, otherwise, he would not
be an other.
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VII

Now, it is true that psychoanalysts have often been hostile to
the idea of analysis as a pure hermeneutic practice. Lacan himself
said that the hermeneutic reconstruction
was "a university's
obscenity," perhaps in the wake of Ricoeur's essay on Freud.12
Such mistrust, however, seems to originate in a misunderstanding, in the fact that hermeneutic reflection is identified with philosophical phenomenology, but the field of phenomenology does
not exaust the hermeneutic reflection.
Hermeneutics
today
should be conceived of not as a particular philosophy, but rather
as a cura, a care, a concern; it is to care for any act which entails
interpretations, understanding, acknowledgement, reading, comprehension, and so forth.
The hermeneutic question is switched on every time one is
confronted, not with natural facts which require causal scientific
explanation, but rather with a fact of communication-a
text or a
message. As a corollary to this, there seems to be an irreducible
splitting between the scientific calculation of nature and the
hermeneutic practice of interpretation.
But psychoanalysis has
not yet renounced the demand of being considered scientific,
probably because, if it insisted in moving into the field of
hermeneutic practice, it would risk losing most of its imaginary
respectability as a science.
Karl Popper and his followers have observed, not without
good reasons, that psychoanalysis is not scientific because it is
irrefutable. Lacan, also, in his late seminars, agreed with this
point of view: psychoanalysis was certainly not a science in the
modern sense. I often participate in debates in which analysts try
to defend desperately the scientific validity of psychoanalytic theories against Popperians, mostly without much success. But it
seems that many analysts would feel less respectable if Popper's
theses were right, and they prefer to put their necks on the line in
philosophical debates rather than serenely accept that their practice does not have the objective and calculable character of modern science.
Analysts tend to propose a Bild, that is, in German, an image,
or a representation, of the subject, rather than agree with the idea
that they are working on a Bildung, in German, a formation, an
edification, in the sense of a re-education of the subject. Indeed, it
hurts the professional dignity of analysts if you tell them they are
re-educators and not men or women of science. Sometimes they
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liken themselves to explorers mapping out new lands and continents, like Columbus or Livingstone. Often they use special
metaphors in order to describe the mind. Even the Freudian
topology does not escape this tendency to topologize the subject.
In fact, except for some important contributions by Lacan on the
logic of time, it is rare to find analytic work which deals with the
time of the unconscious. Although the unconscious is timeless,
according to Freud, the analytic process takes place in time. The
Cartesian assumption that the aim of objective knowledge resides
in a space-object-that
is, an extension-prevails
tenaciously in
modern analytical thinking.
Time, however, builds and destroys in silence, without producing Bild, and, therefore, without an image. Further, the
dimension of time does not deal with identities but with differences. It is not by chance that hermeneutic reflection has invested
a great deal of interest in historiographic work: The hermeneutic
interest in the differentialdimension of time prevails over the identifying dimension of space. The dimension of time does not constitute a so-called universal or eternal knowledge.
Time is
connected to the historical particularity of any Bildung, that is,
specificity of any formation or edification.
We know that it is a fundamental rule of modern scientific
' knowledge that it be universally valid and beyond time. In fact,
we could not state that Newton's laws of gravitation are valid for
the universe for exactly one thousand years, and not valid for
another thousand years. Scientific knowledge tends to abolish
temporal particularities. That is why hermeneutic reflection is, in
some sense, scandalous, for it aims at a knowledge which is not
universally and eternally valid, but rather particular, an ephemeral knowledge which is on this side of the rhythms of time.
The Cartesian, scientific gaze is that of a subject placed outside the world and outside time, one who enunciates theories
which aim at universal truths. The psychoanalytic gaze is instead
hardly a gaze at all; it is rather a particular form of conversation
in which the two subjects seek acknowledgement-in
other
words, it is a hermeneutic interpretation, one which operates on
and aims at an acknowledgement.
An analysis is good not when it observes from outside the
subjective world, but when it inhabits the human world in time.
Unlike the scientific Bild and its specular image which has a flashing and instantaneous character, the psychoanalytic edification
unfolds in time, like speech itself in its slowness. Freud said
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somewhere that psychoanalysis does not distinguish itself from
magic in any essential way, but only as being "slow magic ." 13
VIII

I would like to conclude with an anecdote from a seminar in
Italy attended mainly by young people. The audience did not
seem very convinced about my insistence on the fact that psychoanalysis is not a science. At a certain point I said, "The evidence
that it is not a science is the fact that none of you is yet a great
analyst."
What I meant to say was that: we know that in the calculative and objective sciences young people and neophytes are
advantaged in competition and research, while in psychoanalysis
an analyst usually only writes some good things after twenty
years or more of analytical practice. This difference in the careers
of analysts and scientists is not a secondary or casual phenomenon; indeed, it seems that the ethics of psychoanalysis exacts
the slowness proper to a process of formation and edification, not
only of the analysand but of the analyst too. And this is because
the analyst's knowledge and the analysand's unconscious are not
in the same relation to each other as the scientific gaze is to natural phenomena.
At the end of the seminar, one participant asked me: "If you
are not happy with any theoretical tradition in psychoanalysis,
which tradition or which school would you propose to us?" A
rather "enlightened"
request, for, in fact, it is the man of
Enlightenment who believes he can choose his own tradition, his
own history, his own language, and his own mental categories.
But it is no more possible to choose a tradition or a histor, than it
is to choose one's own sex. Certainly more and more people get
surgical sex changes: I would elect them the existential champions of Enlightenment. A wide part of hermeneutic philosophy
insists on this central point: that it is not possible to get rid of
one's own tradition and history. Wanting to get rid of them is an
illusion. Plato had already seen this in his own way.
However, though the answer I gave to the audience was not
"enlightened" in any standard way, it may have been consciously
paradoxical: "The only way to find your tradition and the analytical school which suits you ... is to follow faithfully the tradition
to which you belong by chance, for the meantime .. . . Maybe only
in this way will you find out reallythat you are dissatisfied with it."
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